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Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117, allows a party to 
seek monetary redress for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and 
willful trademark dilution. Under the fee-shifting provision of Subsection 
1117(a), the prevailing party in actions brought pursuant to the Act’s 
provisions may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”1  
Traditionally, in order to find a case “exceptional,” courts required a 
threshold determination2 that the losing party engaged in some form of 
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 1 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 2 See, e.g., Mister Softee of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Boula Vending, Inc., 484 F. App’x 623, 
624 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring “finding of willfulness, fraud, or bad faith [as] a prerequisite 
to finding a case sufficiently exceptional to warrant an award of fees under section 1117(a)” 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)); Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 
2007) (same); cf. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., Ltd., 282 F.3d 23, 31 
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culpable conduct such as bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing 
infringement.3 
However, on the same day in 2014, the Supreme Court decided 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,4 and Highmark Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.,5 both of which concerned the 
identical fee-shifting provision found in section 285 of the Patent Act.6  
Octane Fitness relaxed the traditional test for what constitutes an 
“exceptional case” in the patent context, while Highmark emphasized that 
such determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Taking a hint 
from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Octane Fitness, Circuit and district 
courts handling Lanham Act cases have reassessed whether a case is 
“exceptional,” but with differing results.  Even so, several trends have 
emerged that practitioners should keep abreast of in prosecuting successful 
fee applications. 
II. OCTANE FITNESS AND HIGHMARK 
In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
“overly rigid” interpretation of “exceptional cases” under Section 285 of 
the Patent Act.7  The Federal Circuit previously held that a case was 
“exceptional” only when a district court either found “litigation-related 
misconduct of an independently sanctionable magnitude or determine[d] 
that the litigation was both ‘brought in subjective bad faith’ and 
‘objectively baseless.’”8  The Supreme Court decided that under the 
“inherently flexible” statutory text, “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one 
that stands out from others with respect to [1] the substantive strength of a 
party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the 
                                                                                                             
(1st Cir. 2002) (defining “exceptional cases” as those in which the defendant’s actions were 
“malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” or “when equitable considerations justify 
such awards,” but refusing to recognize “bad faith or fraud” as a “necessary precondition” 
to an award (internal citation omitted)). 
 3 See Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 537 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (requiring demonstration of bad faith, or that the violative acts were “malicious, 
fraudulent, deliberative, or willful” in order to find the case “exceptional” (internal citation 
omitted)); Schwartz v. Rent A Wreck of Am., Inc., 468 F. App’x. 238, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(defining “exceptional cases” in the context of prevailing plaintiffs as those in which “the 
defendant’s conduct was malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature” (internal 
citation omitted)); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(defining “exceptional cases” as those found to be “either groundless, unreasonable, 
vexatious, or pursued in bad faith” (internal citation omitted)). 
 4 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 5 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 6 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
 7 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (abrogating Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 
F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 8 Id. (quoting Brooks Furniture Mfg., 393 F.3d at 1381). 
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facts of the case) or [2] the unreasonable manner in which the case was 
litigated.”9  This determination, the Court stressed, is a “case-by-case 
exercise of [a district court’s] discretion, considering the totality of the 
circumstances.”10  In a footnote, the Court added that, in this exercise, 
“district courts could consider a ‘nonexclusive’ list of ‘factors,’ including: 
‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual 
and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances 
to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’”11  Highmark 
made clear that, in utilizing the new Octane Fitness standard for Section 
285, a district court’s fee award determination is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard.12 
Significantly, in defining “exceptional” in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning, Octane Fitness conspicuously cited approvingly of 
then-Judge Ginsburg’s opinion (joined by then-Judge Scalia) in Noxell v. 
Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant,13 in which the D.C. Circuit 
“interpret[ed] the term ‘exceptional’ in the Lanham Act’s identical fee-
shifting provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), to mean ‘uncommon’ or ‘not run-
of-the-mill.’”14  Nonetheless, both Octane Fitness and Highmark left 
unsettled whether the Court’s interpretation of “exceptional cases” applies 
with equal force to Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act. Federal appellate 
courts, however, were quick to read between the lines. 
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE LEAD 
Little more than four months after the high court handed down 
Octane Fitness/Highmark, the Third Circuit decided Fair Wind Sailing v. 
Dempster, and, consequently, became the first federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals to hold that the Octane Fitness standard to determine “exceptional 
cases” applies to Subsection 1117(a) of the Lanham Act.15  In so holding, 
the Third Circuit relied on the fact that Section 285 of the Patent Act is 
identical to Subsection 1117(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress referenced 
Section 285 in passing Subsection 1117(a), and Octane Fitness relied on 
Noxell in determining when a case is “exceptional.”16  The Fair Wind 
Sailing panel further explained that the Octane Fitness standard relieved a 
district court of having to make a threshold determination that the losing 
                                                                                                             
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 1756 n.6 (internal citation omitted). 
 12 Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747–48. 
 13 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.). 
 14 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
 15 764 F.3d 303, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 16 Id. 
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party engaged in culpable conduct.17  Instead, “[t]he losing party’s 
blameworthiness may well play a role in a district court’s analysis of the 
‘exceptionality’ of a case.”18 
Early in 2015, the Fourth Circuit followed suit in Georgia-Pacific 
Consumer Products LP v. Von Drehle Corp.19  Based on the reasoning of 
Fair Wind Sailing, the Georgia-Pacific panel determined that “there is no 
reason not to apply the Octane Fitness standard when considering the 
award of attorneys’ fees under [Subsection] 1117(a).”20  The Fourth 
Circuit delineated a “totality of the circumstances” standard for an award 
of attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act that, to date, remains the most 
comprehensive: 
(1) there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the positions 
taken by the parties . . . based on the non-prevailing party’s 
position as either frivolous or objectively unreasonable; 
(2) the non-prevailing party has litigated the case in an 
unreasonable manner; or 
(3) there is otherwise “the need in particular circumstances to 
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.21 
And quite recently, the Sixth Circuit in Slep-Tone Entertainment 
Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc., strongly suggested to the district court 
on remand that it determine whether the Lanham Act case at hand was 
“exceptional” under the Octane Fitness standard.22 
While both the Supreme Court and Circuit courts have stressed the 
importance of considering Lanham Act attorneys’ fee award applications 
on a case-by-case, totality of the circumstances basis, notable trends have 
emerged in the considerations used by district courts; we proceed to 
spotlight such trends. In addition, we have identified several simple, but 
critical practice tips to bolster arguments on both sides of fee award 
applications.  Moreover, not all district courts are convinced that Octane 
Fitness applies to the Lanham Act’s fee-shifting provision, thus requiring 
practitioners to keep up with trends in particular Circuits. 
                                                                                                             
 17 Id. at 315. 
 18 Id. 
 19 781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 20 Id. at 721. 
 21 Id. (quoting Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 n.6; Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 
315). 
 22 782 F.3d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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IV. DISCREPANCY IN THE MERITS 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Octane Fitness is that it 
permits a district court, for the first time, to award attorneys’ fees based 
on the strength of the losing party’s litigating position.  The recent case of 
Renna v. County of Union, which emerged from the District of New Jersey, 
is a prime example.23  Although a rather unique case, Renna provides 
valuable insight into how Octane Fitness will be applied to future cases. 
In Renna, the plaintiff produced a local public-access television show 
geared towards criticizing the Union County government.24  On her show, 
the plaintiff displayed a graphic of the Seal of Union County.25  The 
County applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
trademark the seal.26  The County then sent plaintiff a cease-and-desist 
letter, claiming the seal was “a pending trademark” and its use violated the 
County’s trademark rights.27  Thereafter, the County’s application was 
denied after the USPTO found that Section 2 of the Lanham Act,28 
prohibited registration of a United States municipality’s insignia like the 
seal.29  The County did not timely appeal this decision, and the USPTO 
later sent a Notice of Abandonment of the County’s application.30 
Nevertheless, four months after the application’s denial, the County 
sent the plaintiff a second letter asserting that the “[s]eal is in fact now 
trademarked” and its use violated federal and state trademark law.31  The 
letter also suggested that the seal’s usage by the plaintiff might constitute 
a crime under New Jersey state law.32  The plaintiff thereafter filed—and 
won on summary judgment—a declaratory judgment as to the County’s 
rights with respect to the seal.33  The district court found that the County 
could never sustain a claim of infringement under Section 32 of the 
Lanham Act because the seal was an unregistered (and essentially 
unregisterable) mark under Section 2, and was not a protectable 
                                                                                                             
 23 No. 2:11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52381 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2015) (Renna III), 
adopting Renna v. Cnty. of Union, No. 11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1370 (D.N.J. Jan. 
6, 2015) (Magistrate op.) (Renna II). 
 24 No. 11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1370, at *2. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at *2–3. 
 28 15 U.S.C. 1052(b). 
 29 Renna II, No. 11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1370, at *2. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at *4. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at *5–7; see also Renna v. Cnty. of Union, No. 2:11-3328, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74112, *37 (D.N.J. May 29, 2014) (Renna I) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff). 
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unregistered mark under Section 43(a).34  The plaintiff then moved for 
attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act.35 
The magistrate Judge recommended that attorneys’ fees be awarded 
under Octane Fitness and Fair Wind Sailing, finding the case exceptional 
because of the “significant disparity in the merits of the parties’ respective 
litigation positions.”36  Specifically, the magistrate found that the County 
“litigated this case by asserting that [p]laintiff violated a registered 
trademark which [the County] knew, or should have known, did not exist,” 
given the USPTO’s rejection and the express parallel federal and state 
statutory bars to registration of the seal.37  The magistrate further noted 
that it was hard-pressed to find any purpose, “other than general 
intimidation,” for the County’s citation to an inapplicable criminal statute 
in official correspondence with a citizen.38  In sum, attorneys’ fees were 
warranted under Subsection 1117(a) because the County maintained a 
meritless position prior to and during litigation.39 
Adopting the magistrate’s recommendation, the district court 
remarked that exceptionality is not confined to a party that asserts a 
“wholly meritless or frivolous” position, but can apply to a position that 
has a “sliver of merit,” as did the County’s Section 43(a) claim.40  The 
court also emphasized that “pre-litigation conduct,” here the County’s 
letters that contained “baseless threats,” was a factor in its “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis.41 
First and foremost, Renna demonstrates that district courts will not 
shy away from wielding their new power under Octane Fitness and Fair 
Wind Sailing to award attorneys’ fee when the losing party takes a largely 
meritless position.42  Renna expressly declined to find bad faith, fraud, or 
maliciousness on the County’s part—a finding that could have previously 
precluded fee recovery—but held the relative discrepancy in the merits of 
the parties was enough to justify an award.  Additionally, Renna shows 
                                                                                                             
 34 Renna II, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1370 at *6.  Quite notably, at least one leading 
treatise disagrees with the district court’s reasoning; it observed that “there is no authority 
allowing the Section 2 standards to be grafted onto questions of trademark validity under 
Section 43(a) or denying trademark protection to otherwise distinctive trademarks that are 
‘inappropriate.’” 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 3.04 (Matthew Bender 
ed., 2015); see also id. at § 7.02. 
 35 Renna II, No. 11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1370, at *5. 
 36 Id. at *20. 
 37 Id. at *20–21. 
 38 Id. at *21–22. 
 39 Id. at *22. 
 40 Renna III, No. 2:11-3328, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52381, at *8–9. 
 41 Id. at *11–12. 
 42 Again, at least one leading treatise did not believe that the County’s position was 
meritless. See Anne Gilson LaLonde, supra note 34, at §§ 3.04, 7.02. 
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that district courts will consider pre-litigation events.  Even in 
communications initially outside the purview of courts, there is a need for 
civility and reasonable legal judgment.  Had the County simply acquiesced 
to letting the plaintiff use the seal once it realized the mark could not be 
registered and had little-to-no chance of being protected as an unregistered 
mark, it could have avoided time-intensive and costly litigation. 
Renna was no fluke.  Other district courts in more typical Lanham 
Act cases have awarded attorneys’ fees under the first Octane Fitness 
factor, citing a party’s use of specious legal arguments as a claim’s 
foundation and very weak or non-existent presentation of evidence on a 
claim element.  For example, in Donut Joe’s, Inc. v. Interveston Food 
Services, LLC, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit awarded attorneys’ 
fees to the prevailing defendant in a trademark infringement suit, citing 
the plaintiff’s “extremely weak arguments” at the summary judgment 
stage to rebut the defendant’s position that the plaintiff’s mark fell into the 
“descriptive” category, as well as the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence 
that its mark had acquired secondary meaning.43  The plaintiff relied solely 
on the roundly rejected legal position that its mark is protected as 
registered with the USPTO.44  Moreover, the plaintiff had a comparatively 
very weak argument on the “likelihood of consumer confusion” prong, 
given the nature of the mark and the plaintiffs “presented evidence of, at 
most, five instances of consumer confusion over a three year period.”45 
Like Renna, Donut Joe’s illustrates the importance of advancing 
sound legal theories grounded in well-developed factual support.  Failure 
to adhere to these precepts may now result in attorneys’ fees under Octane 
Fitness. 
V. GETTING TO UNREASONABLE 
By and large, district courts are awarding attorney’s fees under the 
second Octane Fitness factor when the losing party engaged in conduct 
that would have merited attorneys’ fees under the old standard—for 
instance, sanctionable conduct, unjustified litigating tactics, and fraud.  In 
awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, the court in Cross 
Commerce Media, Inc. v. Collective, Inc., pointed to, among other things, 
the fact the defendant took “unreasonable positions” in discovery, its 
“manner and timing of its production of documents,” and its erroneous 
position that one of its officer’s did not possess relevant information.46  
                                                                                                             
 43 No. 2:13-CV-1578-VEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87724, at *9–10 (N.D. Ala. July 
7, 2015). 
 44 Id. at *10. 
 45 Id. at *11. 
 46 No. 13-cv-2754, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177176, *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2014). 
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Nonetheless, not all district courts have been so quick to pull the trigger 
on attorneys’ fees where one party engaged in questionable—and even 
sanctionable—conduct during litigation.47 
And of course, extreme cases continue to warrant attorneys’ fees, 
now sailing under the flag of “compensation and deterrence.”  When 
courts seek to award fees under the Lanham Act for purposes 
of compensation, an “exceptional case” is usually found simply because 
the losing party has needlessly extended or frustrated the litigation, which 
in turn required attorneys to expend their time in an otherwise unnecessary 
manner.  However, for purposes of deterrence, courts find a case to be 
exceptional when the losing party’s core business model or claims made 
in litigation are to be censured for purposes of public policy. 
In River Light V, L.P. v. Lin & J International, Inc., both the 
defendant’s business model and claims made throughout the action were 
in need of deterrence.48  There, the defendants were engaged in an 
enterprise that manufactured and sold merchandise that a district court 
ultimately found was counterfeit and infringed on the trademarks of the 
well-known fashion brand Tory Burch.49  However, it was the defendant’s 
conduct before and during the litigation—not simply the counterfeiting 
and infringement—that ultimately led the court to conclude that the case 
was “exceptional.”50  This conduct included: fabricating documents 
submitted to the USPTO in support of a trademark application, producing 
false evidence during litigation, engaging in spoliation, and continuing to 
sell their infringing merchandise even during the litigation.51  Based upon 
the falsehoods, the defendant pushed even further by filing “spurious 
counterclaims” for tortious interference with business relations, 
defamation, and “ironically,” abuse of process.52 
The Court found that these actions constituted an “extensive and 
flagrant fraud” that was done “with the intent to deceive and profit at the 
expense of the administration of justice” and found the case to be 
exceptional in order to deter such conduct in the future.53  The court 
likewise relied on the fact that the plaintiffs should be compensated 
because the conduct “substantially delayed this litigation, driving up 
                                                                                                             
 47 See, e.g., Fla. Van Rentals, Inc. v. Auto Mobility Sales, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-1732-T-
36EAJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108130, *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2015); Monster Daddy v. 
Monster Cable Prods., No. 6:10-1170-MGL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83477, *6–8 (D.S.C. 
June 19, 2014). 
 48 No. 13-cv-3669, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82940 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2015). 
 49 Id. at *3–5. 
 50 Id. at *29. 
 51 Id. at *3–5, *8–9, *29. 
 52 Id. at *4. 
 53 Id. at *3–4, *29. 
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discovery costs and clogging the docket with unnecessary applications and 
motion practice.”54 
Riverlight is an excellent example of the intersection between ethics 
and case prosecution, particularly in the type of case where a court can 
grant fees.  Practitioners should be wary of answering Lanham Act 
complaints with specious or impassioned Answers and Counterclaims, 
even when proud clients demand they do so. In such instances, it is better 
to counsel the client to litigate in an evenhanded manner, lest the court 
enter sanctions.  Likewise, although it goes without saying, as officers of 
the court, attorneys are duty-bound to not indulge clients who might seek 
to purposely mislead the court or their adversaries.  After Octane Fitness, 
courts’ thin patience with such conduct is much more likely to result in the 
entering of an order awarding fees in Lanham Act cases. 
VI. PRACTICE TIPS 
 1. TOWARDS A MORE CIVIL PRACTICE 
As is evident from the aforementioned cases, courts are often swayed 
in their decision-making process when a party has been particularly 
vexatious in its litigation tactics.  While this is certainly true with respect 
to cases in which the non-prevailing party is blameworthy, such as in 
Renna, it is likewise true with respect to cases in which both prevailing 
and non-prevailing parties were unreasonable in their manner of litigating. 
For example, in AFD China Intellectual Property Law (USA) Office, 
Inc. v. AFD China Intellectual Property Office, the parties were initially 
associated in a joint venture to provide Chinese-based intellectual property 
services to clients located in the United States.55  After the venture fell 
apart, the parties filed claims against one another for, among other things, 
unfair competition and trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.56  
The court found in favor of the defendant on those issues, but awarded 
only nominal damages because the defendant had not presented any such 
evidence.57 
When the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees and expenses under 
the Lanham Act, the court noted the applicability of Octane Fitness, but 
found that as to the “reasonableness in the manner of litigation,” “both 
parties were contributors to the unnecessary complication, expense, and 
length of this litigation,” and therefore denied the defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. at *4. 
 55 No. 3:09-cv-1509-BR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175434, at *3 (D. Or. Dec.19, 2014). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at *6. 
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application.58  The court pointed to the fact that the parties could not agree 
on relatively straightforward tasks, such as developing a verdict sheet, 
refused to confer on issues like the setting of expert witnesses until the 
court brought them to heel, and were both generally untimely in their 
motion practice.59  According to the court, “these [were] but a few 
examples of the parties’ mutual inability to cooperate with each other and 
to respond sufficiently to the Court’s orders and inquiries.”60 
AFD China is a model example of a Lanham Act fees case in which 
the court has imposed the Shakespearean “plague on both their houses.”  
That is, the court found faults with both sides’ tactics, and determined that 
the case was not “exceptional” under the “unreasonableness” principle of 
Octane Fitness due to those universal faults.61  This again shows the need 
for attorneys to take the proverbial high road with their adversaries and 
with the court, no matter how difficult it might seem.  Though the plaintiff 
in AFD China was awarded nominal damages on its claim for unfair 
competition and trademark infringement, it might have walked away with 
its fees and expenses paid if its attorneys engaged the adversary and the 
court in a competent and timely manner regardless of whether the 
adversary returned in kind. 
 2. LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION 
Like any other matter in which the law remains unsettled, 
practitioners must remain mindful of the Circuit in which their case is 
venued in prosecuting or defending Lanham Act fee applications.  While 
the Third and Fourth Circuits have clarified their views on Octane, other 
Circuits remain less clear, which has led to district courts to come to one 
of three conclusions.  On one end of the spectrum, district courts, 
particularly in the Second and Sixth Circuits, have eschewed Octane 
Fitness in favor of old standards without binding Circuit precedent.62  
Other courts have seesawed; finding that under Octane Fitness or any 
other standard, the particular case would or would not be “exceptional.”63  
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at *12–14. 
 59 Id. at *14–20. 
 60 AFD China Intellectual Property Law (USA) Office, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-1509-BR, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175434, at *20–21. 
 61 Id. at *9, *21. 
 62 See, e.g., Wagner v. Mastiffs, Nos. 2:08-CV-00431, 2:09-CV-00172, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 125160, *8–10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2014); Romag Fasterners, Inc. v. Fossil, 
Inc., No. 3:10cv1827, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113061, *14–16 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2014). 
However, the Sixth Circuit’s recent suggestion to assess Octane Fitness’s applicability will 
likely reverse the feeling of district courts within its purview. See Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp., 
782 F.3d at 317. 
 63 See, e.g., PODS Enters., LLC v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. 8:12-cv-01479-T-27MAP, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111701, *56 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2015); Penshurst Trading Inc. v. 
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Finally, still other courts are prescient enough to fully rely upon Octane 
Fitness, often utilizing Fair Wind Sailing and Georgia-Pacific to craft 
their ruling even prior to a binding decision from their circuit court.64  
Given the state of the law, many practitioners must either rely upon district 
court precedent, or the Circuit precedent of other circuits, in drafting their 
arguments.  Nonetheless, the trend toward full adoption in all Circuits is 
clear. 
                                                                                                             
Zodax LP, No. 14-cv-2710, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104029, *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015); 
Cross Commerce Media, Inc., No. 13-cv-2754, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177176, *7–8. 
 64 See, e.g., Fla. Van Rentals, Inc. v. Auto Mobility Sales, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-1732-T-
36EAJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108130, *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2015); RCI TM Corp. 
v. R&R Venture Grp., LLC, No. 6:13-cv-945-Orl-22DAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18762, 
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